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(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereo 
(1) By PriTntxTT; By Stipulation."" SuFJ 
to the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, 
of any applicable statute, an action may be d 
missed by the plaintiff without order of cour 
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time b 
service by the adverse party of an answer or 
motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filin 
stipulation of dismissal signed by all partie 
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwis 
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulat 
the dismissal is without prejudice, except th 
a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudica 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who 
once dismissed in any court of the United Sta 
or of any state an action. 
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided 
in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, 
an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's 
instance save upon order of the court and upon such 
terms and conditions as the court deems proper. 
. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant 
prior to the service upon him of. the plaintiff's 
motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dis-
missed against the defendant's objection unless 
the counterclaim can remain pending for independent 
adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise speci-
fied in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph 
is without prejudice. . . . 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MURRAY 
CO. , a 
JOHN V. 
BENSON, 
MURRAY 
CO. , a 
GEORGE 
FIRST THRIFT &. LOAN ) 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
BENSON and EMILY SUE ) 
/ 
Defendants, ) 
and ) 
FIRST THRIFT & LOAN ) 
corporation, ) 
Third-Party ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
P. RUFF, ) 
Third-Party ) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
Case No, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN CO, 
STATEMENT. OF THE CASE. 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. (hereinafter "Murr'.u *") 
is the plaintiff in this action. Plaintiff brought suit aga'.ist 
John V. and Emily Sue Benson, his wife, (hereinafter sometimes 
l!Bensonsn) to collect on various notes and foreclose on various 
mortgages given by defendants Benson to Murray, a lending 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
institution. (Third-party defendant George P. Ruff [hereinafter 
"Ruff"] was the Murray loan officer who had processed the Benson 
loans which gave rise to the action.) 
Defendants Benson, by their Answer and Amended Answer 
(R. 125-138), alleged that certain of the transactions by which 
Ruff had disbursed Murray's funds were not represented by notes, 
or other evidence of indebtedness and, therefore, were unenforce-
able and that Ruff had failed to credit payments made on the 
loans to BensonsT account. Defendants further made general 
denials of indebtedness to Murray, which denials, according to 
Bensons1 counsel's opening statement, were based upon the above 
lack of documentation, forgeries by Ruff and fraudulent induce-
ment of the contracts of indebtedness. Transcript of March 9, 
1976 Proceedings, 13-14. Defendants also filed a Counterclaim 
and Amended Counterclaim, seeking to recover damages from 
Murray for fraud, misappropriation of funds and forgery, all 
allegedly perpetrated by Ruff. R. 133-135, 131-137. 
Subsequent to the Counterclaim1s filing, Murray filed 
a three-count Third-Party Complaint against Ruff, seeking 
indemnification of any judgment which Bensons might obtain against 
Murray on their Counterclaim and Amended Counterclaim, seeking 
the principal amount of, and interest on, any sums, disbursed 
to the Bensons wh:,h Murray might be unable to recover as a 
result of Ruff's failure to discharge and fulfill his duties as 
a loan officer (i.e., failure to obtain sufficient collateral 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from Bensons, failure to obtain duly executed promissory 
notes from Bensons and failure properly to keep accurate 
records and accounts for sums disbursed by Murray to Bensons 
and payments received from Bensons), and for wrongful conversion 
to his own use of funds disbursed for Bensons. R. 139-144. 
Murray's Complaint alleged - and, by the time of 
trial, there was no dispute on this point - that Ruff, as a loan 
officer of Murray's, had caused his employer to disburse more 
than One Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Dollars ($176,000.00), in 
seventeen transactions, ostensibly for loans to John and Emily 
Benson. None of that principal, or interest accruing thereon 
after February, 1974, had been repaid to Murray. R. 1-28. 
As to the seventeen transactions in which those funds had been 
disbursed, only two conclusions were possible: That Bensons 
legally were indebted to Murray or that the funds had been 
disbursed without indebtedness by Bensons attaching, because 
Ruff either had forged loan documents, diverted funds issued 
for the Bensons for other purposes, failed to prepare loan 
documents, or fraudulently had induced Bensons to take out the 
loans in the first place. If the latter were true, Ruff was 
liable to Murray for loss of its funds. Further, if Ruff, in 
disregard of his duties, had fai\?.d to secure proper collateral 
for the indebtedness and the indebtedness therefore was un-
collectable, he similarly was liable to his employer for his 
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misconduct. If Murray were made whole - either by voluntary 
payment by Bensons or by enforcement of a judgment - Murray 
would be unable to recover additionally from Ruff on its Third- < 
Party Complaint. Murray's third-party claim, therefore", supple-
mented its claim against the Bensons and the claim could not 
be evaluated divorced from Murrayfs claims against Bensons. "~ ( 
Bensons1 indebtedness, which Murray asserted, was 
secured by mortgages on certain real property, an apartment 
complex in St. George, Utah (which, incidentally, represented d 
the great majority of Bensons1 total assets). R. 116-124. 
The case was set for trial in the District. Court of Washington 
County, March 9, 1976. During a recess, after, the opening i 
statements and before presentation of evidence, Bensons 
offered to settle Murray1s claims against them and to dismiss 
their counterclaims against Murray, by transferring their i 
St. George property to plaintiff. Murray accepted that settle-
ment. R. 30-33. Of course, at the moment of settlement (liter-
ally minutes before evidence would have been presented to a jury), i 
Murray had no way of knowing to what extent it could recover • 
its losses by liquidation of the Benson property. Murray's 
settlement with Bensons was announced to the Court and tl*e t 
Court ordered dismissal both of Murray's Amended Complaint and 
Bensons1 Counterclaim and Amended Counterclaim. R, 35. 
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Murray moved the Court that Counts II and III of 
its Third-Party Complaint ~- be dismissed without prejudice, 
on the ground that Murray "will not know until we have liqui-
dated the Benson property, whether and to what extent Murray 
has been injured by the apparent defalcation of Mr. Ruff". 
March 9, 1976 Proceedings, p. 33. As Murray's counsel stated .-• 
to the Court: "We have now, through this settlement, obtained, 
or will obtain, title to real property of indeterminate value. 
It is quite possible that the liquidation of this property 
will leave us without damages ... ." Therefore, Murray con-
tended, it was impossible, to go forward with a claim against 
Ruff at that time. March 9, 1976 Proceedings, p. 34. 
In response to plaintiff's motion for dismissal 
without prejudice, Ruff's counsel urged, "I have almost un-
believable expenses because of the complications that detail, 
which the Court hasn't been subject to [?], unfortunately, as 
of this moment11 and resisted dismissal without prejudice. 
Counsel appeared to move that the Third-Party Complaint be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
-~
/
 By Cou-f: II, Murray sought to recover'the losses which it 
had incurred by reason of Ruff's failure properly to. col-
lateralize the Bensons' loans, to obtain proper promissory 
notes and/or to keep accurate records of disbursements; by 
Count III, Murray sought to recover funds which it had dis-
bursed, but which had not been received by Bensons. 
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The Court thereupon ordered: "the third-party suit 
against the defendant George Ruff, dismissed with prejudice 
.. . ." Id^, 35. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE. 
Although dirvassal without prejudice after service 
of an answer is discretionary with the Court, by the terms of 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2), that discretion is not absolute. 
The Court: of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that the 
purpose of FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2)-- which is identical to 
the Utah rule — !fis primarily to prevent voluntary dismissals 
which unfairly affect the other side, and to permit the im-
position of curative conditions.t! Durham v. Florida E. C. Ry. 
Co.,385 F.2d 336, 368 (5th Cir. 1967). See also, Alamance 
Ind. v. Filene's, Inc., 291 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1961). 
The presentation of evidence in the above case had 
not begun at the time of plaintiff's motion. Expenditures in 
coming to St. George for trial were an accomplished fact by 
the time plaintiff moved for dismissal without prejudice. The 
only inconvenience which plaintiff could have suffered by 
dismissal without prejudice would have been the prospect of 
the litigation continuing through a new lawsuit, if plaintiff 
could not be made whole by its settlement with Bensons. I:: is 
-6-
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well settled that the mere prospect of a second lawsuit is 
insufficient to bar dismissal without prejudice. Holiday 
Queen Land Corp..v, Baker, 498 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1973). 
Accord, Goodman v. Gordon, 447 P.2d 230 (Arizona 1968). 
The only burden which Ruff's counsel alleged had, 
or would have been, imposed upon his client by dismissal 
without prejudice would have been the "unbelievable expense" 
which Ruff already had incurred. If Ruff in fact would be 
compelled, by the filing of a later action, to spend funds 
which could have been avoided by plaintiff proceeding to 
trial on March 9, reasonable compensation could have been made-
a condition of a subsequent filing. As was held in Selas 
Corp.. of America v. Wi;shire Oil Co. of Texas, 75 F.R.D. 3, 8 
(E.D. Pa. 1972): 
The basic question to be asked in deciding whether 
to order dismissal with (rather than without) pre-
judice is this: will the defendant suffer some in-
justice which cannot he rectified by the imposition 
of terms and conditions on a dismissal without pre-
judice? 
CONCLUSION 
There is no Utah case law addressed to the question o 
this appeal. However, the authority of jurisdictions with 
identical rules dictates compellingly that the Court has abused 
its discretion in this matter. For the foregoing reasons, the 
decision of the Court below should be reversed and the case 
remanded for dismissal without prejudice. ••• 
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R i c a r d o B. F e r r a r i 
(John A. Snow 
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